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Introduction
Executives in United States companies have always been compensated well for their
services. This trend continues as executives’ pay increases every year. Publicly traded
companies must file a statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission every year
disclosing the amount and type of compensation plans for their executives. The goals and
measures used to determine the amount and type for their compensation is not required to be
determined using the same numbers that are audited in the financial statements. Companies
can award top executives based on earnings and goals that the company did not actually
achieve by making unaudited earnings per share (EPS) adjustments. These adjustments are
often disclosed in the annual proxy statements, however, they are usually difficult and
confusing to understand. Shareholders, investors, financial analysts, and the public depend on
companies having their financial statements audited and their earnings being presented fairly.
Using unaudited earnings per share to determine if and how much an executive should be
compensated for their services each year is a misleading and unethical practice being used
increasingly more in the United States by publicly held companies.

Literature Review
There has been extensive research on various aspects of executive compensation. This
has included studies on why executives are given compensation packages as well as what these
packages should include in regards to cash, equity, or other forms. Stock options are becoming
the preferred compensation for high income owners. The increasing gap between executives
and their employees’ pay has also been addressed by the financial industry. Additionally, the
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disclosure of compensation plans to shareholders and the shareholders’ right to vote on the
approval of compensation plans for their executives has been extensively studied.
Most executive compensation packages include base salary, cash bonuses, stock
bonuses, stock options, a non-equity incentive plan, pension, and others. These packages for
executives are put together by the board of directors and managers and must be approved by
shareholders. Shareholders did not always have the right to vote to approve or deny a plan.
After many protests and studies were done in the financial industry, and in response to the
Recession of 2008, The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was
signed into federal law by President Obama in 2010. The law requires that shareholders vote
and approve executive compensation plans for publicly traded companies (SEC). Shareholders,
therefore, play a more active role in the compensation plan approval process and have a direct
say in whether or not an executive receives the compensation plan created by the board of
directors.
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act was intended to give shareholders a voice in the
process, to decrease shareholders’ disapproval of executive compensation plans, and to
decrease the extreme amounts that some executives receive in bonuses. For example, Target’s
Chief Executive Officer’s (CEO) compensation decreased from $20 million to $13 million in
response to shareholders’ complaints that he made too much money relative to the company’s
performance (Harris). However, this is not the case in many corporations as the votes are nonbinding, and the law has not had quite the effect that was expected. In 2013, “a full 72 percent
of companies reporting votes have received 90 percent or more shareholder approval for their
pay packages. That compares with 69 percent in both 2012 and 2011” (Eisinger B5).
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Additionally, “98% of companies pass their say-on-pay votes in any given year” (Chasan). These
approvals may not be the approvals that the law was hoping to require as shown by the 2014
Coca-Cola say-on-pay vote. Coca-Cola claimed in 2014 that its’ executive compensation had
been approved by shareholders by an 83% approval vote. However, Coke only counted the
shareholders who actually voted and three of the top six largest shareholders did not support
the compensation plan and withheld from voting. If Coke were to count all shareholders in
computing the vote, only 49% of the shareholders would have been calculated as approving the
compensation plan (Sorkin). Shareholders gaining the vote on compensation packages is not
decreasing the amounts that executives are being paid; the amounts executives are being paid
through compensation plans are continuing to increase each year.
Currently, the executive compensation plans and the various parts that make up a plan
are displayed in a table in companies’ proxy statements to be read by current and future
investors. The disclosure of the arrangement of compensation plans was not always required.
However, it was argued that shareholders did not have all of the information that they ethically
should about the company they chose to invest in. The disclosure of compensation amount and
structure including stock options and severance is now required by law to be filed with the SEC
in companies’ proxy statements, which are available to shareholders as well as to the public
following the passing of the SEC Act of 1934 and subsequent amendments. Under this law,
companies are subject to Regulation S-K. This regulation requires, “clear, concise,
understandable disclosure of all plan and non-plan compensation awarded to, earned by, or
paid to the named executive officers…including disclosures of salary, bonuses, pension
contributions, the fair value of stock, and option awards as well as the fair value of corporate
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benefits provided by the firm to the executive” (Bertomeu 474). The requirement of the
disclosures of all executives’ compensation should increase awareness and understanding of
compensation plans by shareholders, investors, financial analysts, and the public.
Additionally, shareholders fought to earn the right to vote on compensation plans. The
shareholders can now use the disclosed information to make informed decisions when voting
for the board of directors, on the approval of compensation plans, and on other aspects of the
business. This was heavily supported by Michael Oxley, co-author of the Sarbanes-Oxley law
that helped overhaul corporate governance for U.S. public companies. Oxley had even
predicted that, “massive intervention by the government was possible if boards failed to do a
better job of reining in compensation” and that “time is running out to see some courage and
some leadership by boards of directors, if that doesn’t happen, somebody is going to do it
[reform compensation] for them” (“The Ethics of Corporate Compensation”). The government
had to pass a law to get companies to allow their shareholders to view, understand, vote, and
approve the compensation plans created by the board of directors. However, this does not
guarantee that shareholders fully understand the calculations used to create compensation
plans or that the calculations are standardized or audited. Executive compensation alone is
complex enough to generally take up about 30 pages of a company’s proxy statement. This
allows for companies to change the values used to compute compensation plans without using
ethical decision making and without suffering any penalties for exercising unethical accounting
practices. The unethical practices being used include giving executives big bonuses and
compensation overall that they do not deserve based on the companies audited earnings, and
not disclosing the use of non-audited financial measures that are not accepted or standardized
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by GAAP in creating, calculating, adjusting, and publishing their executive compensation plans.
Shareholders are often unaware that these practices are being used or how to interpret the
proxy statement where they are disclosed.
The compensation a company offers to an executive is influential in a person’s choice to
pursue a high level position in that company. A company must offer competitive compensation
packages in order to attract and retain essential executives. Recently, most compensation
plans are calculated on a case by case basis (Landsberg 19). This means that two people in the
same position, level, and company would not necessarily receive the same bonus package. This
can be beneficial to the executive based on what the executive prefers such as a plan tailoring
to retirement savings, income, or equity. Compensation pay must also relate to the
accomplishment of a company’s goals, company mission, and vision. Corporate performance
goals are often driven by financial earnings or return. Therefore, compensation is used to
influence future behavior to strive for good financial performance by the company (Landsberg
19-20).
Compensation plans are determined by the board of directors and are laid out in the
company’s required SEC filing proxy statement. They are often computed based on the
company’s yearly earnings relative to their predetermined goals. The board of directors have
the ability to define these goals and measures of performance however they wish, thus directly
influencing the payment of their top executives.
Compensation packages for executives are shifting towards a greater inclusion of longterm incentives. Long-term incentives are more desirable because they can create a bigger
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return than short-term incentives. This includes cash performance rewards as well as restricted
stock. This type of restricted stock does not reach full value for a specified period of time,
creating time for stock prices to increase therefore increasing the compensation received. By
tying the performance to compensation using stock options, CEOs should have motivation to
strive to maximize stock prices to receive this pay for performance (Cormany). Stock options
and shares were 63% of total compensation in 2013. The motivation to maximize stock prices
should align CEO’s incentives more closely with those of the shareholders and benefit the
shareholders. In Coca-Cola, however, these stock options were only available to 5% of the
company’s work force (Sorkin).
Compensation plans are determined by the board of directors and are laid out in the
company’s required SEC filing Proxy Statement. They are often computed based on the
company’s yearly earnings relative to their predetermined goals. The board of directors have
the ability to define these goals and measures of performance however they wish, thus directly
influencing the payment of their top executives.
If compensation is tied to performance, it can be tax deductible. The Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) definition for performance states that performance can be defined by the
company as it chooses as determined by a compensation committee of the board of directors
(26 U.S. Code § 162 - Trade or Business Expenses). For example, in 2012, “Exelon Corp. awarded
more than $20 million in cash bonuses to top managers as tax deductible “performance-based
pay”” (Smith). Because the performance targets are set by each company individually,
companies’ directors can deliberately set targets low so that they are always met in order to get
paid. On average, “management’s bonus goals were 2.6 cents a share easier to achieve than

7

market analysts’ estimates” (Smith). While setting low annual performance goals is present in
many corporations, this is not always the case. For example, among the 100 largest companies
that had filed proxies by April 4, 2014, 26 CEOs had been given a pay cut. Among them was
Coca-Cola CEO Muhtar Kent who took a 16% cut (Sorkin). Mr. Kent still received the large sum
of $20,380,660 in total compensation in 2013.
A deduction is available for the first $1,000,000 salary paid to the CEO and next 4
highest employees of a company (26 U.S. Code § 162 - Trade or Business Expenses).
Theoretically, this should contain executive pay. However, top executives are still being paid
large sums. According to the 2013 Equilar 100 C.E.O. Pay Study, the “median compensation of a
chief executive in 2013 was $13.9 million” (Morgenson). Stock options are attractive due to tax
benefits. High income taxpayers’ incomes are taxed at higher rates. However, stock options are
taxed as long-term capital gains, which are taxed at a lower level (Cormany). This is beneficial
because the taxpayer will be able pay less taxes on the stock options than if the compensation
received from the stock options was classified as regular income. One of the problems that this
causes in the United States is that according to the congressional Joint Committee on Taxation,
tax advantaged bonuses awards, those meeting the $1,000,000 salary cap or performance
based compensation requirement for tax deductions, by corporations “cost the U.S. Treasury
$3.5 billion a year” (Smith). This number will continue to grow as more companies take
advantage of these tax benefits.
In 2013 the United States House and Senate introduced legislation that would make all
executive compensation subject to the $1,000,000 cap for deductibility, eliminating the
exception for performance pay. In 2014, with the passing of the Affordable Care Act, “any
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health insurance executive pay above $500,000 is non-deductible” (Anderson). The Joint
Committee on Taxation estimates that if this was applied across the board it would generate
$50 billion over 10 years. In addition to generating more tax funds, the passing of more
restrictive legislation would encourage companies to reconsider giving such large bonuses to
top executives instead of to other employees or shareholders.
It has also been argued that the amount and structure of compensation affects an
organization in regards to company culture and loyalty. Since 1979, “the disparity between the
pay of executives and their employees has grown from thirty-five times average salary to more
than 270 times average salary, and total packages have reached as high as $131 million per
year” (Cormany). In 2014 Harvard Business School conducted a study that concluded that
“Americans believe CEOs make 30 times as much as unskilled workers, Americans believe that
CEOs should only make 7 times as much as unskilled workers, and that in reality, CEOs made
354 times as much in 2012” (Vollmer). Executives are being paid much higher amounts
compared to their employees. This gap in compensation between executives and employees
can possibly create many hostile employees in the workplace towards their executives, board
members, and the company as a whole. Employees are not being compensated as well as their
executives in response to the company’s success and the gap continues to increase every year.
Some companies even choose to continue these compensation plans when their financial
statements show that their company had an unsuccessful year and is losing money.
In 2008, there were even hearings held by the government regarding the practice of
executives’ compensation being increased when the company had lost money and had an
unsuccessful year being done by major companies in the United States. Countrywide
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(purchased by Bank of America in 2008) lost $1.6 billion in 2007 and its stock lost 80% of its
value. Merrill Lynch lost $10 billion and its stock lost 45% of its value. Citigroup also lost $10
billion and its stock lost 48% of its value. Despite enormous company losses, the CEOs were still
paid substantial amounts in bonuses ("U.S. House Committee Holds Hearing on CEO Pay"). This
might indicate that some executives would rather have a high paycheck and bonus than see
their business be successful. If executives are forced to step down from their positions due to
poor company performance, they are still paid a great amount of money and essentially go
unpunished financially.
Companies that are awarding their executives financial rewards through compensation
packages are often engaging in unethical business and accounting practices by awarding large
amounts using non-audited earnings to determine the type and amount of compensation. They
are being greatly rewarded even if their company’s stock is decreasing in value and the
company is not showing growth and is suffering from losses. They are rewarded at the expense
of the shareholders who do not fully understand the calculations made when creating
compensation plans. Compensation plans can be created using non-audited earnings and by
changing earnings calculations in order to meet predetermined goals because compensation
plans are not regulated and audited like the financial statements. Executives can be given
compensation that does not accurately reflect the company’s actual earnings or financial
position, therefore, participating in unethical accounting practices.
There has been debate recently on how executives’ compensations are computed
because the earnings used to compute these profits are not required to be audited or conform
to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). There is speculation that companies make
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unannounced adjustments to their GAAP accepted earnings, specifically earnings per share, in
order to meet performance goals or expectations. Only by reading the proxy statement does a
shareholder learn of the adjustments. Because the proxy statement is not regulated by GAAP,
this is legally allowed though not necessarily ethical. This can be a misleading calculation to
investors or potential investors that receive or consider proxy statements who believe that the
compensation plans are based on the earnings listed on the audited financial statements.
Companies are required to disclose “factors considered in decisions to increase or decrease
compensation materially [and] no quantitative assessment of contingent performance payoff is
required” (Bertomeu, 474). This means that companies are not required to disclose their target
levels specific to any quantitative or qualitative performance-related factors considered when
calculating the compensation. This can lead to unethical decisions made by many companies.
Some companies choose voluntarily to disclose additional information in the proxy statement
such as specific weights used.
Many companies that have an increase in earnings per share from the previous year do
not use the GAAP audited earnings per share when giving their CEOs and other executives pay
raises. The Wall Street Journal reported that based on disclosures in proxy statements by
companies that have at least $700 million in stock that isn’t in control of the company, 542
companies in 2013 used earnings that did not follow GAAP to determine executive pay
(Rapoport). Using adjusted earnings per share that do not follow GAAP can have significant
impact on the amount that is ultimately awarded to CEOs.
Additionally, tax deductions could be a contributing factor to the practice of
unregulated earnings used in computations of executive compensations. If bonus payments
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result from the achievement of performance goals they are deductible under the Revenue
Reconciliation Act of 1993. This is an incentive for companies to compute their bonuses based
on unaudited earnings and achievable goals rather than on the earnings presented on the
audited GAAP financial statements. This is unethical because it does not truly reflect how well a
company did or did not do that year. This practice is misleading in the long-term to the
company’s employees, investors, and to the general public.

Method
To investigate the ethics behind compensation plan calculations, to determine if
unaudited measures are being used in publicly traded companies, and how often unaudited
measures are being used I considered twenty-six companies from a variety of industries. These
included technology, agriculture, retail, finance and insurance, health care, natural resources,
and others. Industry leading companies were selected to be studied as well as some of personal
interest. Companies that have been speculated by financial analysts, recent published articles,
or studies as companies that have unethical compensation plans and have used unethical
accounting practices in determining executive compensation were also considered. These
companies are similar in that they all must meet the same standards in order to be traded
publicly.
Upon selecting the companies to study, I began to gather data on them. I mainly looked
at the companies’ financial statements and proxy statements. All publicly traded companies are
required by law to file the proxy statements with the SEC every year, so they are available to
the public. Within the proxy statement, “a company must disclose information concerning the
amount and type of compensation paid to its chief executive officer, chief financial officer and
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the three other most highly compensated executive officers” (SEC). Therefore, I looked at the
proxy statements to learn the amounts and other financial data about companies’ executive
compensation plans. For each company I recorded the CEOs total compensation for the past
three years as well as the amounts of the salary, bonus, stock, stock options, non-equity
incentive plan, pension, and other for the current year. This data is shown in Table 1 in the
Appendix. I also studied how the various parts of these plans are computed.
In order to further gain an understanding of a company’s executive compensation plans,
I studied other aspects of the plans that were disclosed. By law, companies are also required to
disclose, “The criteria used in reaching executive compensation decisions and the degree of the
relationship between the company's executive compensation practices and corporate
performance” (SEC). This information is shown in various tables and descriptions in the proxy
statement. I studied these tables and descriptions in order to improve my knowledge of the
many ways that companies evaluate and distribute compensation to executives and to evaluate
the ethics of these compensation plans.

Results
Of the twenty-six companies that I researched, nine of them had a decrease in earnings
per share shown on their annual reports from 2012 to 2013. Apple’s EPS decreased by $4.61,
however, the CEO received an increase in total compensation of $77, 735 or 2%. This was
comprised of salary, stock options, and other. The other eight companies showing a decrease in
earnings per share in 2013 also decreased their CEO’s compensation by an average of 35% from
2012. For example, Casey’s notes in their proxy statement that the range in EPS to result in
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bonus was $3.10-$3.32. Actual EPS was well below this range and decreased from the previous
year. As a result, no awards were earned under the annual incentive plan for the 2013 fiscal
year. Casey’s CEO’s total compensation decreased by 49%. Table 2 and Chart 1 in the Appendix
compares the companies that had a decrease in earnings per share and their CEO’s increase
(decrease) in total compensation. This data shows that based on the sample, companies’
compensation committees are responding to a decrease in earnings per share.
Of the twenty-six companies sampled, twelve companies admitted to shareholders in
their proxy statements to using an adjusted earnings per share for determining CEO and
executives’ compensation. Many of these adjustments had positive results for the CEOs. The
companies in the sample that disclosed a non-GAAP earnings per share adjustment in their
respective proxy statement are shown in Table 3 in the Appendix. The table compares
companies’ GAAP earnings per share to the CEO total compensation. For example, in 2013
Cisco had a 25% increase in GAAP earnings per share and adjusted the earnings per share to
result in an 80% or $9,361,835 increase in total CEO compensation. Exelon had a 41% increase
in GAAP earnings per share in 2013 that was adjusted by an increase of $0.50 a share to result
in a 69% or $6,990,448 increase for the CEO’s total compensation. Johnson & Johnson’s CEO
received a 54% or $5,933,851 increase in total compensation, however, the unadjusted GAAP
earnings per share only increased by 25%. Proctor & Gamble had only a 5% increase in GAAP
earnings per share, but the CEO received an 18% or $2,766,073 increase in total compensation.
These examples show that when earnings increase, CEOs’ total compensations also increase but
by a substantially bigger amount.
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While some companies disclose the way that they adjusted their GAAP earnings per
share in the proxy statement, some simply give a description of the adjustments without
providing any numerical data. JP Morgan Chase shows a calculation of a $1.35 adjustment,
Walgreens shows a calculation of a $0.56 adjustment, and Exelon shows a calculation of a $0.50
adjustment. Exelon’s calculation as shown in the 2014 Proxy Statement:

Figure 1: Exelon Adjusted Operating Earnings Per Share

Other companies use a variety of methods to adjust earnings per share such as excluding stock
payments to employees, stripping out goodwill write-downs, or excluding expenses related to
acquisitions but still counting the earnings generated by acquisitions (Rapoport). Cisco’s proxy
statement does not give a calculation or numerical data of the non-GAAP earnings per share
adjustment, but provides a description of the adjustment:
Share-based compensation expense; compensation expense related to acquisitions and
investments; changes in estimates of contingent consideration related to acquisitions
and investments; amortization or impairment of acquired intangible assets including in-
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process research and development; impacts to cost of sales from purchase accounting
adjustments to inventory; all external acquisition-related costs such as finder’s fees,
advisory, legal, accounting, valuation, hedging or other professional or consulting fees
directly associated with acquisitions and investments; and each of the following subject
to pre-established thresholds; the impact of any cumulative effect of changing to newly
adopted accounting principles; operating income of the acquired entity and its
subsidiaries as reflected on the financial records thereof; losses due to impairments or
loss contingencies; direct losses on Cisco’s tangible assets from natural catastrophe,
war, insurrection, riot, terrorism, confiscation, expropriation, nationalization,
deprivation, or seizure; and restructuring charges (Cisco).
This shows how companies will go to great lengths to use and justify non-GAAP, unaudited
adjustments made to earnings per share that are used to determine executive compensation.
This is evident whether they choose to disclose the adjustments through a table with
calculations or a description of the adjustments made. Some companies even use these nonGAAP adjusted measures as the profit targets they must hit in order for executives to receive
incentives.
Executive compensation continues to be awarded in high amounts whether or not the
company’s actual performance was high. As shown in Table 4 in the Appendix, in the sample
taken of 26 companies for the year ended 2013, the average CEO total compensation was
$18,251,421 and the highest total compensation was $78,440,657 awarded to the CEO at
Oracle. The lowest total compensation was an honorary $1 awarded to the CEO of Google
although he still owns a stake in the company worth billions. The next lowest total
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compensation was $1,195,591 awarded to the CEO of Casey’s. The data also shows that on
average, the highest portion of total compensation is stock which makes up 55% of the average
total compensation. Chart 2 in the Appendix displays the various parts of compensation
packages and what percentage each part is of the average total compensation of the sampled
companies.
The SEC requires that publicly traded companies disclose the amount and type of their
compensation plans that reward their executives. It does not, however, have the jurisdiction to
require a standard structure for the amount and type of compensation that a company grants,
or standardize how it is calculated.
Because companies are not required to give their executives’ compensation based on
any standard, they can administer bonuses however they wish. Companies have to make a
business decision on how they will reward their executives. Nevertheless, just because they are
making a wise business decision does not mean that it is an ethical decision. Many of the
companies researched did not make these decisions ethically and instead shaped their goals
and performance measures so that they would comfortably meet these goals and measures in
order for the executives to receive large compensation. For example, 93% of Walt Disney’s
CEO’s compensation was based on performance (Eavis). He collected “a fully deductible $16.5
million cash bonus, 38 percent above the goal, according to the 2013 proxy statement”. This
was based “predominantly on an evaluation of four financial measures including an adjusted
earnings per share range with a midpoint of 4.1 percent below the consensus estimate and 9.4
percent below the earnings result” (Smith). This example shows how performance measures
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can be manipulated in order for the company to meet its’ goals and the executives can receive
a larger bonus.

Conclusion
Executives are being paid high amounts based on unaudited financial goals and
measures. While companies are required by the SEC to disclose the amount and type of
compensation plans used each year in the proxy statement, they are not required to disclose
how it is calculated. Companies are adjusting their GAAP compliant earnings from the financial
statements so that goals are easily achieved and large executive compensations can be
rationalized. These adjustments are not required to be disclosed although many companies do
share them. However, even if the unaudited adjustments are shown in the proxy statement,
this does not guarantee that shareholders know or understand that they are being used.
Shareholders, investors, financial analysts, and the public rely on financial earnings that are
audited in compliance with GAAP, not on confusingly presented disclosures buried deep in a
lengthy proxy statement.
The analysis of the structure and calculation of compensation plans is significantly
beneficial in the financial industry. It encourages the public to consider if the calculations used
in creating executive compensation plans are ethical and if they agree with the board of
directors and executives on how these plans are created and computed. Shareholders are
encouraged to consider this analysis when voting to approve compensation plans. Companies
are encouraged to use ethical accounting practices and make ethical decisions using audited
financial measures including earnings when computing compensations to top executives and
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disclosing executive compensation information in their annual proxy statement. “The definition
and purpose for each adjustment should be explained and the corresponding item in the
financial statements should be identified, located and quantified. When an adjustment is not a
GAAP measure, the basis for its computation should be explained” (IFAC 10). Companies should
disclose more information of adjustments being made and make a greater effort to make these
disclosures easier to read and be understood by the average shareholder. This would allow for
shareholders to make more informed decisions when voting on compensation plans at the
annual meetings. Awareness should also be increased of non-audited measures being used for
executive compensation plans by financial analysts, scholarly journals, and other well-read
publications such as the Wall Street Journal. Companies should attempt to avoid using the
unethical accounting practice of using non-audited financial measures that are not accepted or
standardized by GAAP in creating, calculating, adjusting, and publishing their executive
compensation plans.
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Appendix
Table 1

Company Name
Amazon

EPS
2011

EPS
2012

EPS
2013

CEO
Compensation
(Total) 2011

CEO
Compensation
(Total) 2012

CEO
Compensation
(Total) 2013

Salary

Bonus

Stock

Options

Nonequity
incentive
plan

Pension

Other

1.39

-0.09

0.6

1,681,840

1,681,840

1,681,840

81,840

-

-

-

-

-

28.05

44.64

40.03

377,996,537

4,174,992

4,252,727

1,400,006

-

-

2,800,000

-

-

Bank of America

0.01

0.25

0.94

8,087,181

8,321,300

13,139,357

1,454,167

-

11,143,643

-

-

Casey's

2.89

3.07

2.24

1,219,143

2,365,258

1,195,591

880,000

-

-

-

-

Caterpillar

8.48

5.75

3.01

16,902,023

22,374,744

14,989,569

1,600,008

-

-

7,966,091

CBS

1.97

2.45

3.09

69,900,677

62,157,026

66,932,581

2,086,539

28,500,000

26,499,925

5,845,000

Cisco

1.17

1.5

1.87

12,886,125

11,687,666

21,049,501

1,100,000

-

15,237,652

-

4,700,080

Citigroup Inc

3.71

2.53

4.27

10,658,652

12,377,508

17,558,119

1,500,000

7,915,912

-

2,923,069

3,838

15,300

Coca Cola

1.88

2

1.94

29,115,573

30,460,186

20,380,660

1,600,000

-

6,399,988

7,113,946

2,200,000

2,204,814

861,912

Deere & Co

6.71

7.72

9.18

18,802,364

19,031,943

19,148,372

1,435,644

-

6,241,025

3,058,773

6,705,518

1,187,345

520,067

DuPont

3.82

2.94

5.22

15,926,631

15,662,717

14,152,638

1,435,000

-

6,740,550

2,700,001

2,014,000

864,679

398,408

Emerson Electric

3.27

2.67

2.76

12,786,600

10,360,122

25,318,952

1,300,000

Exelon Corporation

3.72

1.42

2

5,562,144

10,201,250

17,191,698

1,191,539

Exxon Mobil

8.43

9.7

7.37

34,920,506

40,266,501

28,138,329

2,717,000

38.82

32.81

30.17

1

1

1

1

HCA Holdings

4.97

3.49

3.37

5,738,346

46,359,246

16,527,665

1,339,973

J P Morgan Chase

4.48

5.2

4.35

23,105,415

18,717,013

11,791,833

1,500,000

-

10,000,000

Johnson & Johnson

3.54

3.94

4.92

6,836,860

10,977,109

16,910,960

1,453,846

-

5,988,975

Microsoft

2.73

2.02

2.61

1,376,915

1,318,128

1,261,218

697,500

Apple

Google

Miller Energy
Resources

5,200,000

2,000,000
3,670,000
-

21,556,450

-

12,606,074

1,565,250

21,254,625

0

-

2,241,766
-

550,000

-

278,745

36,846

2,964,405

217,299

1,343,336

1,230,859

-

462,502

4,867,361

-

-

-1.165.502

-0.48

-0.6

-0.48

2,766,484

1,029,245

1,298,750

742,212

1.67

1.96

2.26

77,559,820

96,160,696

78,440,657

1

1,126

76.893.600

1.165,502

Proctor & Gamble

3.93

3.66

3.86

16,188,037

15,198,597

17,964,670

1,817,391

4,945,600

6,446,532

4,235,006

Southern Company
United Parcel
Service

2.55

2.67

1.87

9,754,242

13,035,348

8,438,291

1,152,289

3,128,625

2,085,747

3.84

0.83

4.61

13,053,098

12,147,349

10,335,665

1,079,913

8,272,663

475,277

465,877

Walgreens

2.94

2.42

2.56

13,654,636

12,041,058

12,116,245

1,333,333

6,836,271

2,724,490

2,047,499

Walt Disney Co

2.56

3.17

3.42

33,434,398

40,227,848

34,321,055

2,500,000

1,040,355

8,804,278

8,478,239

13,570,000

23,482

-

291,833

1,739,000

191,779
13,718

544,000

-

496,704
-

-

Oracle

243,994

0
-

3,292,380
2,669,999

11,769

1,584,841
0

-

-

497,751

-

-

10,771,475

52,721
44,796

-

-

1,600,000

12,538
1.545.930
520,141
1,199,307

805,738

66,485

21,895

691,148

41,935
-

968,538
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Table 2

Company Name

Apple

Casey's

Caterpillar

Coca Cola

Exxon Mobil

2012 EPS

44.64

2013 EPS

40.03

2.24

3.01

Increase (Decrease)

(4.61)

(0.83)

(2.74)

2012 Total CEO
Compensation

4,174,992

2,365,258

22,374,744

30,460,186

2013 Total CEO
Compensation

3.07

5.75

2.00

Google

HCA Holdings
3.49

J P Morgan Chase
5.20

Southern
Company

9.70

32.81

2.67

1.94

7.37

30.17

3.37

4.35

1.87

(0.06)

(2.33)

(2.64)

(0.12)

(0.85)

(0.80)

40,266,501

1

46,359,246

18,717,013

13,035,348

4,252,727

1,195,591

14,989,569

20,380,660

28,138,329

1

16,527,665

11,791,833

8,438,291

Increase (Decrease)

77,735

(1,169,667)

(7,385,175)

(10,079,526)

(12,128,172)

0

(29,831,581)

(6,925,180)

(4,597,057)

Increase (Decrease)

2%

-49%

-33%

-33%

-30%

0%

-64%

-37%

-35%
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Table 3

Company
Name

Cisco

Coca Cola

Deere & Co

Exelon
Corporation

J P Morgan
Chase

Johnson &
Johnson

Proctor &
Gamble

Oracle

Southern
Company

United
Parcel
Service

Walgreens

Walt
Disney Co

2012 EPS

1.50

2.00

7.72

1.42

5.20

3.94

1.96

3.66

2.67

0.83

2.42

3.17

2013 EPS
Increase
(Decrease)
Increase
(Decrease)

1.87

1.94

9.18

2.00

4.35

4.92

2.26

3.86

1.87

4.61

2.56

3.42

0.37

(0.06)

1.46

0.58

(0.85)

0.98

0.30

0.20

(0.80)

3.78

0.14

0.25

25%

-3%

19%

41%

-16%

25%

15%

5%

-30%

455%

6%

8%

11,687,666

30,460,186

19,031,943

10,201,250

18,717,013

10,977,109

96,160,696

15,198,597

13,035,348

12,147,349

12,041,058

40,227,848

21,049,501

20,380,660

19,148,372

17,191,698

11,791,833

16,910,960

78,440,657

17,964,670

8,438,291

10,335,665

12,116,245

34,321,055

9,361,835

(10,079,526)

116,429

6,990,448

(6,925,180)

5,933,851

(17,720,039)

2,766,073

(4,597,057)

(1,811,684)

75,187

(5,906,793)

80%

-33%

1%

69%

-37%

54%

-18%

18%

-35%

-15%

1%

-15%

2012 Total CEO
Compensation
2013 Total CEO
Compensation
Increase
(Decrease)
Increase
(Decrease)
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Table 4

Calculation
Average
Max
Min
% of Average
Total
Compensation

CEO
Comp.
(Total) 2011

CEO Comp.
(Total) 2012

CEO Comp.
(Total) 2013

32,729,296
377,996,537
1

20,666,114
96,160,696
1

18,914,204
78,440,657
1

Salary

Bonus

Stock

Options

Non-equity
incentive
plans

Pension

Other

1,332,654
2,717,000
1

6,409,532
28,500,000
1,126

10,336,245
26,499,925
544,000

3,694,130
8,478,239
0

3,555,912
13,570,000
0

1,005,985
2,964,405
0

342,075
1,230,859
11,769

7%

34%

55%

20%

19%

5%

2%

EPS

(6.00)

(8.00)

Total Compensation

Microsoft

Johnson & Johnson

Walt Disney Co

Walgreens

United Parcel Service

Southern Company

Proctor & Gamble

Oracle

Miller Energy Resources

(4.00)

J P Morgan Chase

HCA Holdings

Google

Exxon Mobil

Exelon Corporation

Emerson Electric

DuPont

Deere & Co

Coca Cola

Citigroup Inc

Cisco

CBS

Caterpillar

Casey's

Bank of America

(2.00)

Apple

Amazon

Percentage Change
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Chart 1

2013 Earnings Per Share and CEO Total Compensation

4.00

2.00

0.00
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Chart 2

Percentage of Average Total Compensation
5%

2%

7%

19%

34%

Salary
Bonus
Stock

Options

20%

Non-equity incentive plan
Pension
Other

55%

